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Voir Dire for California's Civil Trials: Applying the
Williams Standard
by
EMILY M. DE FALLA*
Choosing jurors is always a delicate task. The more a lawyer knows of
life, human nature, psychology, and the reactions of the human emo-
tions, the better he is equipped for the subtle selection of his so-called
"twelve men, good and true."'
Clarence Darrow has been quoted as saying "never forget, almost
every case has been won or lost when the jury is sworn." 2 Most exper-
ienced trial lawyers agree with him3 and argue that it is often difficult to
get a fair and impartial jury.4 While the problem of juror prejudice is
usually associated with criminal cases, civil litigators have become in-
* Member, Third Year Class. Prior to entering law school, this student was a consult-
ant in jury selection.
1. Darrow, Attorneyfor the Defense, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 36, reprinted in C. DAR-
ROW, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 313, 315 (1963).
2. Warshaw, Voir Dire, TRIAL DIPL. J., Fall 1986, at 2.
3. "There is little disagreement among trial attorneys about the importance of voir
dire." Id. Clarence Darrow was an avid proponent of voir dire. In 1937, he published an
article on jury selection and voir dire, writing that "[s]electing a jury is of the utmost impor-
tance." C. DARROW, supra note 1, at 315. The article described the rules and techniques he
employed, which are strikingly similar to those espoused today by modern jury selection spe-
cialists. See infra note 5. For example, the following quotation illustrates his belief in the
importance of case analysis, voir dire, and the careful evaluation of jurors:
So far as possible, the lawyer should know both sides of the case. If the client is a
landlord, a banker, or a manufacturer, or one of that type, then jurors sympathetic to
that class will be wanted in the box; a man who looks neat and trim and smug ....
Every knowing lawyer seeks for a jury of the same sort of men as his client; men who
will be able to imagine themselves in the same situation and realize what verdict the
client wants.
In this undertaking, everything pertaining to the prospective juror needs to be
questioned and weighed: his nationality, his business, religion, politics, social stand-
ing, family ties, friends, habits of life and thought; the books and newspapers he likes
and reads, and many more matters that combine to make a man; all of these qualities
and experiences have left their effect on ideas, beliefs and fancies that inhabit his
mind. Understanding of all this cannot be obtained too bluntly. It usually requires
finesse, subtlety and guesswork. Involved in it all is the juror's method of speech, the
kind of clothes he wears, the style of haircut, and above all, his business associates,
residence and origin.
C. DARROW, supra note 1, at 315.
4. The problem of juror prejudice is far from new. One of the first statements about the
need for impartial jurors was made by Lord Coke, who said, "He that is of a jury, must be liber
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creasingly concerned with it.5 This concern is due in part to changes in
the nature of civil litigation itself, changes that increasingly give jurors
the opportunity to apply their own perspectives on policy when called
upon to render a verdict. Trials are no longer mere fact-finding exercises
for jurors-seldom is a jury called upon to determine simply who ran the
red light. Today, such routine cases usually settle, leaving those of a
more controversial nature to go to trial.6
Jurors bring their opinions and attitudes on policy with them into
homo, that is, not only a freeman and not bond, but also one that hath such freedome of mind
as he stands indifferent as he stands unsworne." 1 E. COKE UPON LITTLETON *155a.
5. In recent years a number of firms have formed to assist trial attorneys in combating
juror bias. For example, the National Jury Project (NJP) was organized in 1975. NATIONAL
JURY PROJECT: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES at vii (2d ed. 1986).
Although much of the legal community quickly accepted the role of jury selection assist-
ants, some feel it is inappropriate to use them. See Pavalon, Jury Selection Theories, TRIAL,
June 1987, at 29. The recent proliferation of firms and individuals that offer jury selection
services, however, demonstrates the increasing importance lawyers place on that portion of the
trial.
In 1982, the field had developed sufficiently to warrant the formation of a professional
organization. This group, now called the American Society of Trial Consultants, has listed
133 members in its 1986 directory.
See also Saks, The Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17
JURIMETRICS J. 3, 3-4 (1976) (describing the "birth" of "scientific jury selection").
6. Routine cases settle because attorneys can make reasonable predictions about which
side is likely to win, and to some extent, what the amount of the verdict will be. This is not
true of many cases involving controversial policy issues. Because jurors are likely to have
volatile feelings about these, the outcome of these cases is unpredictable, making them harder
to settle.
Part of the predictability of routine cases results from modern discovery rules that were
designed, in part, to enhance settlement. Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 830,
65 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (1968). With full disclosure of all the facts, each party can fully evalu-
ate the strength of the opponent's case, and compare it to her own.
The courts have gone still further to encourage settlement. For example, some have set up
special settlement panels, made up of neutral parties that are experienced members of the
plaintiffs and defense bars, and a judge. These programs are generally referred to as compul-
sory or mandatory nonbinding arbitration. Readey, Alternative Dispute Resolution-A Trial
Lawyer's Primer, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 300, 305 (1986). Panelists are selected on the basis of
competency, experience, and objectivity. Id. at 306. The panel members evaluate a case and
tell the litigants what they believe the case is worth, usually in the form of an arbitration
award. Id. The opinions of these panels are given great weight by practitioners, as they com-
bine perspective from both sides with years of experience. Use of the settlement panels results
in a higher percentage of cases settling. Id. Much of the success of this type of program is
attributable to the panelists' ability to predict what a jury will do with a case. Thus, courts
typically utlize these programs in personal injury, property damage, and breach of contract
cases. See id. at 305. When a case involves controversial policy issues, of course, the panel
members are less likely to predict the outcome, and consequently more of those cases go to
trial.
Strong economic incentives encourage settlement as well. When the parties can settle for a
reasonable sum, both plaintiff and defendant avoid risking a substantial investment in the "all
or nothing" result of a trial.
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the courtroom, and those attitudes can affect the outcome of a case.7
Theoretically, jurors make their decisions by resolving disputed versions
of the facts. Then, applying the jury instructions that contain the law,
they determine what they believe to be the proper verdict. They are not
supposed to base their decisions on policy considerations. But jurors nat-
urally rely on their own underlying attitudes and opinions on policy in
interpreting the facts of the case, and these policy concerns necessarily
affect the outcome.8
Two of the best examples of cases in which juror opinions on policy
are likely to play an important role are products liability and medical
negligence cases. In some products liability cases, most notably asbestos
litigation,9 jurors must decide whether to hold a distributor strictly liable
for defects in a product that it neither manufactured nor sold to the ulti-
mate consumer. Making this decision requires the juror to decide
whether she ° agrees with the policy objectives behind strict liability.
For some jurors, holding a distributor liable represents an important pro-
tection for the injured worker or consumer; they concur with the policy
objectives behind strict liability." For others, strict liability represents
the grossest form of unfair overreaching on the part of plaintiffs and their
attorneys. Either opinion is likely to affect a juror's ultimate decision on
a distributor's liability.
In medical negligence cases, a juror must evaluate the alleged negli-
gence of doctors, nurses, or other medical personnel. Some jurors come
to the courtroom feeling protective of doctors or concerned about the so-
7. Clarence Darrow seemed to think that those opinions, or "emotions and instincts" as
he called them, are the determinative elements in juror decision-making:
It is not the experience of jurors, neither is it their brain power that is the potent
influence in their decisions. A skillful lawyer does not tire himself hunting for learn-
ing or intelligence in the box; if he knows much about man and his making, he knows
that all beings act from emotions and instincts, and that reason is not a motive factor.
C. DARROW, supra note 1, at 316.
8. For an overview of juror attitudes relevant to civil jury trials, see generally NA-
TIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 5, §§ 10.03(6), 13.02.
Mr. Darrow's view of the role of the jurors' underlying attitudes was that, "[a]ssuming
that a juror is not a half-wit, his intellect can always furnish fairly good reasons for following
his instincts and emotions." C. DARROW, supra note 1, at 316.
9. Asbestos litigation continues to constitute a major part of the trial calendar in many
California courts. For example, as of September 11, 1986, in Alameda County there were over
100 asbestos cases with trial dates scheduled, over 100 others that required settlement confer-
ences, and an additional several hundred that had at-issue memoranda filed but were still
waiting for settlement conferences and trial dates. In re Complex Asbestos Litig., No. 607734-
9, Gen. Order 1.00 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1986).
10. This Note will use the female gender as a convention to refer to both genders.
11. For a discussion of the policy objectives behind the rule of strict liability in tort for
defective products, see Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30-31, 560 P.2d 3, 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr.
574, 579-81 (1977).
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called medical malpractice insurance crisis, or both. 12 Other jurors come
with a history of bad experiences with the medical profession and con-
sciously or unconsciously await the opportunity to extract revenge.
Whether society benefits from subjecting a distributor to strict liabil-
ity for defective products or a physician to damage awards are but two
examples of the many types of civil cases that raise major policy ques-
tions and provide opportunities for juror bias to affect a verdict. 13 Trial
attorneys must attempt to determine which jurors are biased and remove
them from the venire14 from which a jury will be selected. Voir dire
examination and the exercise of cause and peremptory challenges are the
procedures for accomplishing this task.15
Voir dire is the process of questioning the members of the venire
prior to selection of the jurors who will actually decide the case. 16 In
12. Public opinion on this issue became so polarized that in 1975 the California legisla-
ture passed the the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), limiting a plaintiff's
recovery for pain and suffering to $250,000 in medical negligence cases. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.2 (West Supp. 1987).
13. Major policy questions also arise regarding other factual and legal issues such as, for
example, premises liability, see generally Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116,
213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), wrongful termination, see generally Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. App. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980), highway design defect cases, see generally
Harland v. State, 75 Cal. App. 3d 475, 142 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977), bad faith insurance claims,
see generally Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967),
sexual harassment, see generally Vermuelen, Sexual Harassment, in WOMEN AND THE LAW
§ 308, at 3-30 to 3-31 (C. Lefcourt ed. 1987), and civil rights violations and police misconduct,
see generally NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, POLICE MISCONDUCT LITIGATION MANUAL
(I.M. Avery & D. Rudovsky eds. 1978). Cases that include punitive damage claims are con-
troversial as well. For a general discussion of excessive punitive damage awards, see J.
GHIARDI & S. KICHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE §§ 18.00-18.10 (1985).
14. The word venire comes from Latin, and means "To come, to appear in court." In
modern usage it means the list of jurors summoned to serve as jurors for a particular term.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979).
After the venire has been called into the courtroom the clerk calls the roll. The judge will
then introduce the parties, tell the venire something about the case, and excuse any jurors with
valid hardship excuses. The names of 12 jurors are then drawn at random and those persons
are seated in the jury box. The judge usually asks some preliminary questions before allowing
counsel for each party to question the jurors. See CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGES'
BENCHBOOK 294-95, 314.7-314.9 (West 1986) [hereinafter BENCHBOOK].
15. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
16. Voir dire comes from the French and literally means "[tlo speak the truth." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979).
Many treatises on trial techniques define the attorney's tasks during voir dire to include
establishing rapport, educating jurors, and defusing the opponent's case. See, e.g., J. JAMES,
TRIAL ADVOCACY 167 (1975) (identifying purposes of voir dire to be "elimination, ingratia-
tion, [and] indoctrination"). Case law is quite clear that the only legitimate legal purpose of
voir dire is to gather information about jurors upon which to base challenges. People v. Wil-
liams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 408. 628 P.2d 869, 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 325 (1981); Rousseau v.
West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 882-83, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1967).
A third perspective concerning the function of voir dire is that
the distinction between the educational and informational purposes of voir dire is
[Vol. 39
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California the judge generally begins the process by asking some prelimi-
nary questions. 17 Next, counsel for the plaintiff and the defense may
question the jurors.18 After the questioning, both sides may exercise
challenges. The judge rules upon a challenge for cause, granting it if she
finds that the juror has a close relationship to the case or one of the
parties, or has a "state of mind ... evincing enmity against or bias to
either party."' 19 A successful challenge for cause is almost always based
on an overt admission of bias by a potential juror. 20
During the voir dire process, a party may also exercise a peremptory
challenge without providing any reason to the court, opposing counsel,
drawn far too sharply. In a well conducted voir dire, the tasks of eliciting informa-
tion and educating are integrated. The educational component of the voir dire is best
accomplished through a give-and-take questioning process that encourages the pro-
spective juror to think about the issues she or he will confront in a trial. The stock
educational questions used by many lawyers and judges actually do very little to
educate. Mechanical repetition of the acceptable phrases allows the prospective ju-
rors to avoid thinking about the issues. Education occurs only when jurors are en-
couraged to reflect on the issues and on their attitudes.
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 5, § 10.01[l].
17. BENCHBOOK, supra note 14, suggests that the judge interrogate the prospective jurors
individually on their business or occupation, the business or occupation of their spouse, the
area of the county in which they live, any prior jury experience (including whether it was civil
or criminal, a hung jury, or concerning similar charges to the one at bar), and whether the
juror, a relative or close friend has had any legal training or experience, has been involved in
any way in charges similar to those brought against the defendant, or has had any law enforce-
ment experience. Id. at 295; see also infra note 196.
18. The California Penal Code requires the court to permit attorney-conducted voir dire.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West 1985). In contrast, the federal courts, as well as some state
courts such as those in Massachusetts, do not permit attorney-conducted voir dire as a matter
of course. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(A); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234 § 28 (West 1986); Com-
monwealth v. Pope, 392 Mass. 493, 504, 467 N.E. 2d 117, 125 (1984). In those jurisdictions
the judge controls voir dire and often does all of the questioning herself. The Massachusetts
rule is very similar to the federal rule which reads, in part, "The court may permit the parties
or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination." FED R. Civ. P. 47(A).
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1987).
20. See V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO
JURY LAW AND METHODS 303-04 (1985); see also L. BLUE & J. SAGINAW, JURY SELECTION:
SCIENCE AND STRATEGY § 2.03 (1986).
In People v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court defined the circumstances under
which a challenge for cause is exercised:
A challenge for cause is either "general"-the juror is either legally incompetent to
serve in any case-or "particular"--the juror is actually or impliedly biased in the
specific matter on trial .... Actual bias is "the existence of a state of mind on the
part of the juror in reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which will prevent
him from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of either party .... Implied bias arises when the juror stands in one of several
relationships to a party, such as consanguinity .... "
22 Cal. 3d 258, 273-74, 583 P.2d 748, 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 900-01 (1978).
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or the juror.2 1 Many good reasons exist for permitting such challenges.
In People v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court discussed the pur-
pose of the peremptory challenge and how it differed from the cause chal-
lenge.2 2 The court described a number of circumstances in which one of
the parties might fear bias, but which did not present sufficient bias to
sustain a challenge for cause. Examples given by the court included a
criminal defendant fearing bias from a juror who had been a victim of
crime, or a prosecutor fearing bias from a juror who had a record of prior
arrests or who had complained of police harassment in the past.23 The
court also pointed out that even less tangible evidence might bring forth
a peremptory challenge; a party may feel mistrust of the juror on the
basis of a mere sudden impression, a smile, or a glare. 24
As a rule, jurors do not admit to actual bias during the voir dire
questioning.2 5 Therefore, even if they are biased they cannot be removed
for cause. The peremptory challenge then becomes the only realistic
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1985). But see Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d
at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (although no reason for peremptory challenge need be given,
there must exist a reason in fact; it may not be based upon a "group bias"). See infra notes
119-22 and accompanying text.
If there are only two parties, each is entitled to exercise six peremptory challenges. If
there are more than two parties, the court divides the parties into two or more sides according
to their respective interests, and each of those sides are entitled to eight peremptory challenges.
When there are more than two sides, however, the aggregate number of peremptory challenges
of one side may not exceed the aggregate number of peremptory challenges on the other. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1987).
22. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 275, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902 (1978).
23. Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
24. Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. "Blackstone ... adds another
function of the peremptory: to preserve the appearance as well as the substance of impartiality
by guaranteeing the defendant will not be tried by anyone whom he intuitively dislikes." Id. at
275 n.16, 583 P.2d at 761 n.16, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 n.16.
25. The conditions under which jurors are questioned influence them to hide or distort
facts, often subconsciously. See S. HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN 37-42 (1985).
The quality of any interview, that is, the amount and reliability of the information gath-
ered, is controlled by the conditions under which the interviewer conducts the interview, the
type of information sought, and the interview subject's perception of the interview's end re-
sults. A social scientist would characterize typical voir dire conditions as an interview situa-
tion aimed at establishing potential jurors' qualifications for a task, with the jurors viewing the
interviewer as a person of higher status and authority, and with the interviewer, a judge, and
the juror's peers evaluating the juror's responses. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 5,
§ 2.03.
In voir dire, as with any interview, the juror's natural reaction to stress, embarrassment,
peer pressure, and public exposure will affect her responses to questions. A juror knows that
the goal of the interview is either to include the juror as qualified, or exclude the juror as
unqualified. This knowledge creates a phenomenon called "evaluation apprehension." Id.
§ 2.03[2]. In addition, most people seek to present themselves in the most positive light possi-
ble. In the context of a voir dire examination, fairness and objectivity are the most socially
desirable traits for the juror to portray to the judge, lawyers, and the juror's peers. Thus, it is a
naturally tendency for jurors to respond during voir dire in ways that make them appear fair
and impartial. Id.
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method that a party has available for removing biased jurors. Unless an
attorney has some information about the juror's attitudes and beliefs, she
cannot make an intelligent decision regarding whether a juror's bias war-
rants use of a peremptory challenge. 26 Therefore, if the peremptory chal-
lenge is to be a meaningful tool for the trial lawyer, it must be prefaced
by a voir dire examination that is sufficiently broad in scope to permit the
attorney to discover a juror's bias.27 For this reason, in the 1981
landmark criminal case of People v. Williams,28 the California Supreme
Court expanded the permissible scope of voir dire questioning to include
questions designed to elicit information helpful to the intelligent exercise
of peremptory challenges.
Williams provided a modern analysis of the role of voir dire and its
scope in a criminal case. After Williams, the question remains whether
this same analysis should apply to civil trials. For the past one hundred
years courts have used civil and criminal cases interchangeably as prece-
dent when determining rules for jury selection and voir dire.29 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has in one case, however, made a distinction. 30 In
26. The court in Wheeler revealed the reasons why attorneys jealously guard their per-
emptory challenges:
[I]n view of the limited number of such challenges allowed by statute we may confi-
dently disregard the possibility that a party will squander his peremptories by remov-
ing jurors, simply because he has the right to do so, for frivolous reasons. In
practice, a party will use a peremptory challenge only when he believes that the juror
he removes may be consciously or unconsciously biased against him, or that his suc-
cessor may be less biased.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 274-75, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (footnote omitted).
27. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 404, 628 P.2d 869, 875, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323
(1981).
28. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981). Justice Mosk wrote the
opinion for the five justice majority. He was joined by Justices Tobriner, Newman, Reynoso,
and Grodin. Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurrence, and Justice Richardson a dissent.
All the justices agreed with the central holding expanding the right to ask voir dire ques-
tions for use in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. at 398, 412, 414, 628 P.2d
at 871, 880, 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319, 328-29. Chief Justice Bird wrote separately to suggest
a different formulation of a standard for the court to use in determining which questions it
should permit. Id. at 412-14, 628 P.2d at 880-81, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29; see infra note 73.
Justice Richardson began his dissent by stating "I have no quarrel with the efforts of my
colleagues of the majority as they seek to articulate a broad rule which would permit counsel
'to ask questions reasonably designed to assist in the intelligent exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges .... .' Id. at 414, 628 P.2d at 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 329. He disagreed with the
majority over whether the error had been harmless, and whether a reversal was mandated. Id.
at 415-17, 628 P.2d at 881-83, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 329-31.
29. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
30. In People v. Wheeler, the court announced a new rule regarding the use of peremptory
challenges by prosecutors in criminal cases, and made clear in a footnote that it was not going
to decide whether the rule would apply to defense attorneys or to civil cases:
We do not reach... the question of the applicability of this decision to civil cases.
Although article I, section 16 of the California Constitution governs such cases as
well, most of the state and federal authorities relied on herein invoke the requirement
January 1988] CALIFORNIA VOIR DIRE
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addition, although few cases specifically limit their holdings to criminal
cases, in many instances the basis for a ruling is related predominantly to
criminal rights. 31 Thus, precedent for the one cannot automatically be
used as precedent for the other.
This Note will argue that, although Williams was a criminal case, its
holding should be applied to civil cases in California. Civil litigants have
the same right to an unbiased jury as do criminal defendants and ample
precedent exists for applying criminal decisions on voir dire and related
issues to civil cases. Indeed, California courts have traditionally done
SO. 3 2
In section I, this Note will trace the development of California law
on the permissible scope of voir dire questions, with particular emphasis
on People v. Williams.33 Section II will discuss the legal, policy, and his-
torical reasons for extending the Williams rule to civil cases. 34 Finally, in
section III this Note will outline common objections to such an extension
and explain why such criticism is misplaced.
I. California's Scope of Voir Dire Questioning
The California courts have always permitted voir dire questions
designed to determine whether a juror has an actual or implied bias suffi-
cient for a challenge for cause.35 From 1912 to 1981, however, the law in
California under People v. Edwards did not permit questions designed
solely to obtain information upon which to base the exercise of a peremp-
tory challenge. 36 In People v. Williams, the California Supreme Court
described the genesis of and rationale for this rule:
The existing rule in California comes to us from a 1912 case, People v.
Edwards, in which the court purported to justify its holding with the
of cross-sectionalism in the context of a criminal trial only. Whether the requirement
also applies in a civil setting turns on such considerations as the function of a jury in
that setting. Because the issue is not presented in the case at bar, we leave it to
another day.
22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29.
31. Williams is an example of a case that, although not specifically limiting its holding to
criminal cases, based that holding largely on criminal rights. See 29 Cal. 3d at 404, 628 P.2d at
875, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 323 (purpose of peremptory challenge in criminal trials is twofold: to
insure that jurors are fair and to avoid jurors whose fairness may be seriously questioned).
32. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
33. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981); see infra notes 35-88 and
accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 89-170 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 62 Cal. 377, 381-83 (1882).
36. 163 Cal. 752, 754-55, 127 P. 58, 59 (1912). Counsel also could not use voir dire to
educate the jury panel on the particular facts of the case, compel the jurors to commit them-
selves to vote a particular way, prejudice the jury for or against a party, to argue the case,
indoctrinate the jury, or instruct jurors on the law. Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers,
256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 882, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655, 658 (1967).
[Vol. 39
CALIFORNIA VOIR DIRE
following observation: "there is an increasing tendency to prolong the
proceedings inordinately by allowing counsel on either side to indulge
in tedious examinations of jurors apparently with no definite purpose
or object in view, but with the hope of eliciting something indicating
the advisability of a peremptory challenge, and.., the supposed privi-
lege of doing this has been greatly abused."' 37
Although designed to limit improper and unnecessarily time-con-
suming voir dire, the Edwards rule did not work.38 In fact, if it were to
be applied with strict logic, it would actually impose no significant limita-
tion on examination 39 because numerous grounds exist for making a
challenge for cause. Since neither the court nor the attorney knows how
the prospective juror will answer any question, in theory any question
could provide the basis for a challenge for cause. A judge must rule,
however, on the propriety of a question before the answer is given. Thus,
in reality "the only limitation on the admissibility of a particular ques-
tion under the Edwards rule is the judge's ability or willingness to con-
ceive of a possible response that would reveal legally cognizable bias."4
Moreover, as long as counsel's questions were material to a challenge for
cause, they could be endlessly repetitive or confusing.41
As a result of the "unwieldy standard" set forth in Edwards, courts
developed their own standards-with understandably erratic results.42
For instance, one court developed an ad hoe balancing test comparing
"the likelihood that a particular question would ultimately lead to a chal-
lenge for cause with the probability that it would result in a peremptory
challenge."'43
Dissatisfied with what it perceived to be a limited judicial applica-
tion of the restrictive Edwards rule, in 1927 the California legislature
passed Penal Code section 1078.44 The courts interpreted this statute as
directing the courts to permit only "reasonable examination of prospec-
tive jurors by counsel.. .. -145 Many courts viewed this interpretation as
further justification for restricting counsel's right to ask questions for the
purpose of uncovering latent prejudice. 46 Often, the result was to reduce
voir dire to a "stark little exercise consuming minutes rather than hours
37. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 399, 628 P.2d 869, 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (1981) (citations
omitted).
38. Id. at 399, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 399, 628 P.2d at 872, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 400, 628 P.2d at 872, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
43. Id.; see also People v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81, 87, 273 P. 575, 577 (1928) (questions were
not so much for the purpose of laying basis for challenge for cause as to pave the way for
possible peremptory challenge).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West 1985); Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 400, 628 P.2d at 872,
174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
45. Id. at 400, 628 P.2d at 872, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
46. Id. at 401, 628 P.2d at 872, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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and often eliciting no verbal responses at all."'47
These practices reflected some courts' opinion that actual bias
meant a bias that the juror was aware of and willing to express. Thus, if
a juror were willing to swear that she would judge the case solely on the
evidence adduced during the trial, these courts would take her at her
word, no matter what her actual predisposition. 48
Then in 1980, Jimmie Ray Williams was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter, and his appeal presented an opportunity to challenge the
Edwards rule.49 Williams had been drinking one evening with a friend,
Travis King, when the two men became involved in a fight on a freeway
ramp. Both were arrested. After King was released from jail he went to
Williams' house to retrieve his car. When he arrived, King told Wil-
liams' son that he wished to speak to Williams, and followed the son to
the bedroom where Williams lay sleeping with his one year old grandson.
Williams told his son that he did not wish to be disturbed, whereupon
King pounded on the door, shouted obscenities and demanded that Wil-
liams come out and fight. Williams opened the door and in the ensuing
fight King was fatally shot. 50
Williams was charged with murder. The central issue at trial was
whether Williams had acted reasonably in defense of himself, his home,
and his small grandson. He was acquitted of murder, but convicted of
voluntary manslaughter. 51
A. The Voir Dire Process in Williams
The Williams voir dire began in typical fashion. The judge asked
the jurors, en masse, if they would follow the court's instructions on the
law, regardless of whether they agreed with them. The jurors responded,
en masse, that they would. The trial court also asked the jurors as a
group whether any of them had any quarrel with the proposition that the
prosecution must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. None
of the jurors responded in the affirmative. 52
Counsel then questioned the jurors individually. The court pre-
cluded defense counsel from asking one juror if she could conceive of a
"hypothetical, reasonable, and prudent man," or asking another juror to
give him "a brief idea of your feeling about the right of a person to de-
47. Id. at 401, 628 P.2d at 873, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (quoting Babcock, Voir Dire: Pre-
serving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 549 (1975)).
48. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 401, 628 P.2d at 873, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (citing Note, Voir
Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1495 (1975) (authored by Jay M. Spears)).
49. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981).
50. Id. at 397, 628 P.2d at 870, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 397-98, 628 P.2d at 870, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
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fend himself in his own home."'53
Defense counsel then attempted a different line of questioning. He
sought permission to ask whether the jurors willingly would follow an
instruction that a person has a right to resist an aggressor by using neces-
sary force, and has no duty to retreat. The court also declined to permit
that question. The court, however, did allow counsel to ask generally
whether the members of the panel would follow self-defense instructions
even if they disagreed with the law. Two jurors expressed uncertainty
and confusion in answering this question. One juror replied that he
"could not truthfully answer," and that he did not "know for sure."' 54
The other asked for an example. Even with such apparent juror confu-
sion, the trial court judge refused to permit counsel to ask the questions
he had requested earlier.55
On appeal, the defendant challenged the Edwards rule prohibiting
attorneys from conducting voir dire as a means of uncovering reasons for
peremptory challenges. The California Supreme Court overruled Ed-
wards and, in so doing, adopted the standard that had been adopted long
before by both the federal courts and a majority of state jurisdictions.5 6
[C]ounsel should at least be allowed to inquire into "matters concern-
ing which either the local community or the population at large is
commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short of pre-
sumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations in fact." In
addition, if a particular juror has given the court some reason to sus-
pect he harbors such feelings, even though the general population does
not, further questioning would be appropriate.5 7
The court divided its ruling into three main parts. The bulk of the
opinion addressed the major issue, whether the court should permit a
voir dire question when its sole purpose is to uncover the basis for a
peremptory challenge.5 8 The next portion of the opinion discussed the
trial court's discretion to contain voir dire within reasonable limits,5 9
and the final section of the opinion applied the new standard to voir dire
questions concerning a juror's ability to apply specific doctrines of law.60
53. Id. at 398, 628 P.2d at 870-71, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
54. Id. at 398, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
55. Id.
56. Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, pointed out that the decision was an idea
whose time had come: "Like a moss-covered oak, the doctrine has seemed sturdy because of
its venerable age, but we have only to examine its shallow roots and hollow substance to realize
that it is precariously poised, ready to topple at the first challenging blow." Id. at 397, 628
P.2d at 870, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 318; see also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
57. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 398-407, 628 P.2d at 871-77, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319-25.
59. Id. at 408-09, 628 P.2d at 877-78, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
60. Id. at 409-12, 628 P.2d at 878-80, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 326-28.
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B. The Peremptory Challenge Issue: Striking Down the Edwards Rule
The sole issue raised on appeal was the trial court's refusal to permit
the excluded questions. The defendant argued, despite precedent to the
contrary, that the trial court should have permitted them because they
either would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause, or could
have assisted counsel in intelligently exercising a peremptory challenge.
The California Supreme Court ruled:
We hold that the existing standard is unnecessarily restrictive and arbi-
trarily applied, and adopt the rule prevailing in most other jurisdic-
tions that counsel may make reasonable inquiries to assist in the
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. We further hold that a
question about a prospective juror's willingness to apply a specific doc-
trine of law if so instructed should be permitted if the doctrine is likely
to be applied at trial .... 61
In explaining its ruling, the court examined the history and develop-
ment of the law regarding voir dire in California. 62 It found that the
Edwards rule had created a restrictive and wooden approach to voir dire,
insupportable in light of the "unassailable truth that direct and general
inquiries about juror bias cannot be expected to uncover all forms of
partiality. '63
After giving a detailed and insightful analysis of the purpose of voir
dire and peremptory challenges, the court laid to rest the myth that gen-
eral questions about a juror's ability to be fair are sufficient to elicit ade-
quate information about juror bias. First, the court pointed out that bias
often deceives its host by distorting not only her views of the world
around her, but of herself.64 While a juror may be answering in good
faith when she responds in the affirmative to a general question about her
ability to be fair, further questioning may reveal bias of which she is
unaware or believes she can overcome. Even if a juror is aware that she
holds a certain bias or has knowledge of certain facts that might make it
difficult for her to be impartial, a general question about her ability to be
fair may not bring them to mind. 65
The court then discussed the conditions under which voir dire is
61. Id. at 398, 628 P.2d at 871, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
62. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
63. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 401, 628 P.2d at 873, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
64. In a footnote, the court pointed out that some authorities even suggest that the accu-
racy of a person's estimation of her own fairmindedness is likely to be inversely proportional to
the depth of her actual prejudices. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 402 n.2, 628 P.2d at 873 n.2, 174
Cal. Rptr. at 321 n.2 (citing A. FRIENDLY & J. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 103
(1967)).
65. Id. at 402 & n.3, 628 P.2d at 873 & n.3, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 321 & n.3.
The court also attacked the practice of limiting the use of open-ended questions. Id. at
402-03 & n.4, 628 P.2d at 877 & n.4, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322 & n.4. An open-ended question is
one that does not suggest an answer to the respondent. Generally, it cannot be answered yes
or no, but requires the respondent to answer in at least a sentence, if not a longer narrative.
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conducted and its effect on prospective jurors. It noted that "little psy-
chological insight is needed to realize that the setting in which voir dire is
conducted creates additional pressures for the venireman to answer ques-
tions as he believes the judge would have him answer, or in conformity
with the answers of the preceding panelists."' 66 These practical reasons
led the court to abolish the Edwards rule.
The court also set forth policy reasons for striking down the Ed-
wards rule. It stressed that public support for a system of justice depends
not only on its ability to do justice, but also on its ability to project to the
parties and the public the "unimpeachable image of fairness. ' 67 The per-
emptory challenge has long been a "fixative for preserving that image."'68
Moreover, peremptory challenges provide little benefit if counsel must
exercise them unaided by relevant information. The court found that
because the peremptory challenge is a critical safeguard of the right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury, questions aimed at eliciting informa-
tion relevant to its exercise fall within the bounds of "reasonable in-
quiry," and therefore counsel may properly ask those questions.69
Open-ended voir dire questions often begin with phrases such as "Tell me about . . " or
"What do you think about... T'
A close-ended question is one that suggests its answer to the respondent. In the voir dire
setting, the classic example of a close-ended question is "Will you follow the law as the judge
gives it to you?" Such a question suggests to the respondent that the correct answer is yes.
For most people, telling the judge they would refuse to follow her instructions would be un-
thinkable. That tendency is exaggerated in a situation when, as in Williams, the jurors have no
idea what the instructions might be and therefore have no reason to suspect they would be
disinclined to follow them. See id. at 402-03, 628 P.2d at 874, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322; see also
Hanley, Voir Dire: The View From the Jury Box, 12 LITIGATION, Summer 1986, at 22 (report-
ing on juror frustration at being asked whether they would be fair regarding a case about
which they knew nothing).
66. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 403, 628 P.2d at 874, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322; see also supra note
25.
67. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 404, 628 P.2d at 874, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
68. Id. at 404, 628 P.2d at 874-75, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23.
69. Id. at 405, 628 P.2d at 875, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
The court had several additional reasons for adopting the new rule. First, it was neces-
sary to effectuate the policies enunciated in People v. Wheeler. See infra note 155 and accom-
panying text. Second, the federal courts, and most other state courts agreed with the
proposition that reasonable latitude is necessary in voir dire to allow proper exercise of the
peremptory challenge. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 405-07, 628 P.2d at 875-76, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
323-24. Third, the "compelling wisdom of the majority rule" and the difficulty encountered in
applying Edwards had led some California appellate courts to suggest abandoning it alto-
gether, thereby creating a legitimate conflict in the law. Finally, the court recognized that, in
reality, many courts allow a broad range of questions even when purporting to apply the Ed-
wards rule, thus implicitly acknowledging the legitimacy of voir dire conducted for the purpose
of the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. See id. at 407, 628 P.2d at 876-77, 174 Cal.
Rptr. at 324-25.
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C. Defining the New Standard
The Williams court recognized that trial courts must have broad
discretion to contain voir dire within reasonable limits, but made clear
that "expedition should not be pursued at the cost of the quality of jus-
tice."'70 In providing guidance on how to balance these competing objec-
tives, the court developed a two-prong test. If the trial court finds that
either prong is met, it should permit counsel to ask the questions in dis-
pute. For the first prong, the Williams court adopted the rule from the
United States Circuit Court case, United States v. Robinson,71 that
"counsel should at least be allowed to inquire into 'matters concerning
which either the local community or the population at large is commonly
known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short of presumptive bias
in law yet significantly skew deliberations in fact.' "72 The second prong
of the test allows further questioning when a particular juror gives some
indication that she might harbor some bias, even though the general pop-
ulation might not have such a bias.73
Anticipating the objections and fear that the new rule would herald
a return to the "inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning that
prompted the adoption of the Edwards rule," the court explicitly left
intact the "considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire
within reasonable limits."' 74 The court made clear that if the trial court
must choose between the prohibition of unreasonable conduct to ex-
70. Id. at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (quoting United States v. Blount,
479 F.2d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 1973)).
71. 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
72. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (quoting Robin-
son, 475 F.2d at 381).
73. Id. at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
In her concurrence, Chief Justice Bird criticized the standard adopted by the majority as
"more difficult to apply than its predecessor." Id. at 412, 628 P.2d at 880, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
328 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Her concern was twofold. First, she pointed out that judicial
interpretation of the phrase "matters concerning which either the local community or the
population at large is to known to harbor strong feelings" could differ widely and lead to
unpredictable results. Id. at 412-13, 628 P.2d at 880, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328. Furthermore, in
her opinion, a trial judge's gut-level feelings about the possibility of bias in a community are
not a proper standard for determining whether or not a court will permit a particular question
at voir dire. Id. at 414, 628 P.2d at 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
Second and more importantly, she argued that voir dire should not be limited to "com-
monly known" prejudices. Id. She saw no reason why a defendant should bear the risk that
one of her jurors may harbor doubts about a crucial legal principle merely because most com-
munity members might not harbor such doubts. Therefore, in Chief Justice Bird's opinion, a
court should permit voir dire into all significant legal and factual aspects of a case.
She suggested that the trial court could employ a standard similar to California Evidence
Code section 352 in exercising its discretion on whether or not it should permit a certain
question. Id. at 412-14, 628 P.2d at 881, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29 (Bird, C.J., concurring); see
CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1976).
74. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
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pediate voir dire and the rights of the party to ask probing questions in
order to exercise voir dire intelligently, the latter must prevail. 75
The Williams court reaffirmed that the purpose of voir dire was not
to educate the jury panel to the particular facts of case, compel the jurors
to commit themselves to vote a particular way, prejudice the jury for or
against a party, argue the case, nor indoctrinate or instruct the jury on
the law. Yet a court should not exclude a question that counsel fairly
phrases and legitimately aims at obtaining information essential for the
intelligent exercise of a peremptory -challenge merely because it also
tends to accomplish one of the goals recited above. The court referred to
such a situation as an "unavoidable consequence" of the voir dire
examination. 76
D. Questions on Specific Doctrines of Law
The third issue77 addressed by the Williams court was whether
counsel may ask venirepersons if they are willing to apply specific doc-
trines of law, if so instructed. The court held this practice permissible
and directed the trial court to evaluate these questions in the same man-
ner that it evaluates other voir dire questions. Thus, the trial court
should permit specific doctrines of law when, judging from the nature of
the case, the trial court judge believes that the doctrine is likely to be
relevant at trial.78
75. The court reasoned: "Under this standard, trial courts need not and should not per-
mit the inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning that prompted the Edwards rule.
Nonetheless, 'expedition should not be pursued at the cost of the quality of justice.' " Id. at
408, 628 P.2d at 877, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 408-09, 628 P.2d at 877-78, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26.
77. For a general description of the issues discussed by the Williams court, see supra
notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
78. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 410, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The court dis-
missed a number of arguments made by the Attorney General concerning why courts should
not permit questions on specific doctrines of law. The first argument made by the Attorney
General was the independent rule that counsel should not test jurors on their knowledge of
law. Since the questions in Williams did not require any preexisting knowledge of legal doc-
trines, but only elicited prospective jurors' opinions about them, they did not run afoul of the
rule. Id. at 409-10, 628 P.2d at 878, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
Second, the Attorney General argued that since the jurors had expressed a general will-
ingness to apply those doctrines of law the court might give to them, to permit more specific
questioning would amount to an admission that the jurors would "falsify their answers in
order to be empaneled." Id. at 410, 628 P.2d at 878, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 326. Such an admission
would be contrary to the presumption of veracity to which their answers were entitled. The
court responded to that argument in two ways. It pointed again to the problem of subtle or
unconscious bias, of which a juror might not be aware. This lack of awareness would make it
impossible for a juror to reveal her bias in response to a general "will you follow the law"
question. Secondly, an average venireperson has a limited fund of knowledge from which to
make an accurate evaluation of such a broad question. An affirmative response to a "will you
follow the law" question may be accurate in that she is generally willing to follow the court's
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Furthermore, the court held that refusal by the trial court to permit
a question regarding a doctrine of law could be reversible error. A
higher court should reverse, however, only if it finds the doctrine to be
actually relevant to the case, and the excluded question substantially
likely to expose strong attitudes antithetical to the defendant's cause.
79
After defining the reversible error standard, the court then consid-
ered the three questions that defense counsel had requested and the trial
court refused to permit. Applying the new standard, the court deter-
mined that, while all three were arguably relevant and could properly
have been permitted, only one was erroneously and prejudicially ex-
cluded. 80 The court found that the first question, regarding a juror's abil-
ity to imagine a hypothetical reasonable and prudent man, would have
little potential for exposing prejudice or reluctance by a juror to apply
the law.8 1 The second question dealt with the right to defend oneself in
one's home. Of all the aspects of self-defense law, the court reasoned,
this principle was the least likely to meet with opposition. Therefore it
did not meet the standard the court had established for reversible error.
82
Nor was it compelled under the second prong of the new standard, 3
because the particular juror to whom the question would have been ad-
dressed expressed no reservations about applying the law of self-defense
in response to previous questions. Thus, the court had no reason to sus-
pect the individual juror might quarrel with this generally accepted tenet
of self-defense law.
84
The trial court's refusal to permit counsel to ask the third question,
which concerned the use of force when an avenue of retreat remained
open, mandated a reversal, however. 85 California law does not require
direction. Faced for the first time with an instruction that is repugnant, however, that juror
might hesitate to apply it. Id.; see supra note 25.
79. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 410, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 411, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
82. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 411, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
85. The court failed to discuss a standard for reversible error when the question did not
pertain to a doctrine of law. Although some judges and attorneys interpret this omission to
mean that only questions regarding doctrines of law can provide the basis for a reversal, no
language in the opinion supports that position. Those who advocate that position point to the
following language:
Although in many contexts a procedure depriving defendant of the right to secure an
impartial jury necessarily dictates reversal, that standard should not apply if the po-
tential for bias relates only to a particular doctrine of law. When antipathy to a legal
rule is the issue, its potential effect is limited by the significance of the rule to the
case's outcome.
Id. at 412, 628 P.2d at 879-80, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28 (citations omitted).
If read carefully, however, that language merely states that not all relevant questions on
doctrines of law that are disallowed will mandate a reversal. It is describing a situation in
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the reasonable person to retreat before using force. The court described
this rule as "controversial," reasoning that a real possibility exists that
the average juror might disagree with it. To support this conclusion, the
court noted that the law regarding the duty to retreat under these cir-
cumstances varies substantially throughout the country.8 6 Since the ver-
dict in the Williams case was likely to turn on the question of whether
the defendant killed in justifiable self-defense, a juror who believed that a
person must take an avenue of retreat prior to the use of deadly force
would find it difficult to judge the defendant's conduct objectively under
California law. If defense counsel knew that a juror held such an opin-
ion, she would probably exercise a peremptory challenge against that ju-
ror.8 7 Therefore, the court held that because this question had a
substantial likelihood of uncovering juror bias, the trial court had abused
its discretion in refusing counsel permission to ask it.88
which the error would be harmless. The phrase "only to a particular doctrine of law" in this
context means "only to a particular doctrine of law when that doctrine of law is not one which
is relevant."
There is a better explanation of the Williams court's failure to discuss reversible error in
the context of non-doctrine of law issues. The court probably believed that none of the non-
doctrine of law questions required reversal, and it limited its decision to that which it was
required to decide. In accordance with this view, at least one court of appeal case has reversed
a conviction on a non-doctrine of law issue, relying on Williams. See People v. Wells, 149 Cal.
App. 3d 721, 725-27, 197 Cal. Rptr. 163, 166-68 (1983) (involving questions going to racial
prejudice).
In the absence of additional discussion concerning what is reversible error for non-doc-
trine of law issues, it is logical to apply an identical standard to such questions as that estab-
lished for doctrine of law questions:
[I]n general a reasonable question.., should be permitted when from the nature of
the case the judge is satisfied that [it] is likely to be relevant at trial. Reversal will be
required, however, only if [it] is actually relevant, and the excluded question is found
substantially likely to expose strong attitudes antithetical to [the party's] cause.
Williams, 29 Cal. 3d at 410, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 411, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
The second prong of the standard also would have required that a trial court permit this
question. During the course of the voir dire the trial court should have recognized that certain
jurors expressed some doubt about their willingness to apply self-defense principles with which
they disagreed. Id. at 411, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
87. Id. (quoting United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973)).
88. Id. at 412, 628 P.2d at 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
The court also discussed what might constitute harmless error. It stated that it would not
mandate reversal if "the potential for bias related only to a particular doctrine of law." Id. at
412, 628 P.2d at 879-80, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28 (emphasis added). Whether it should be
considered reversible error depends on how significant the rule is to the outcome of the case. If
the rule is irrelevant to the outcome, in light of the evidence, failure to permit counsel to
examine the juror on the doctrine of law is harmless. It is also harmless error if the rule is
irrelevant as a matter of law, or if no reasonable, impartial juror would apply the rule, if the
jury's verdict indicates that it applied the rule in favor of defendant. Id.
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E. Significance of Williams
The Williams court made five significant points regarding voir dire
in criminal cases. First, Williams reiterated and emphasized that the
peremptory challenge is a critical safeguard of the constitutional right to
a fair trial before an impartial jury. Second, the court held that courts
should permit counsel to ask questions directed towards the intelligent
exercise of those challenges. Third, it approved counsel's use of probing,
open-ended questions in place of the traditional general, conclusory,
close-ended questions. Fourth, since this type of questioning is so impor-
tant, trial courts should permit counsel to ask these questions, even if this
practice results in ancillary undesirable effects, such as slowing down the
trial process or indoctrinating the jury. Finally, the court held that in
some circumstances, the failure of a trial court to permit adequate ques-
tioning will be reversible error. The California Supreme Court in Wil-
liams signalled a change in policy regarding voir dire questions in
criminal cases, allowing more liberal voir dire for the purpose of achiev-
ing a fair trial through the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.
II. Williams Should Be Applied to Civil Cases
A. Criminal Case Precedent Applies to Civil Cases On Jury
Selection Issues
Historically, California courts have used criminal and civil prece-
dent interchangeably in cases involving jury selection issues. 89 The
courts have made little, if any, distinction between the two.90 This in-
terchange is logical because with few exceptions, the function and role of
the jury is identical in both.
Juror misconduct cases are a good example of the interchangeable
use of civil and criminal precedent. Civil courts have used criminal pre-
cedent for defining when a juror has committed misconduct, 9' for hold-
ing that a juror's concealment of bias during voir dire constitutes
misconduct, 92 and for finding that a juror's receipt or communication of
information that is not evidence in the case to other jurors is also jury
89. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
90. The courts are not alone in failing to make any distinction. In the notes of decisions
following the statutes that govern the impanelling of jurors in civil cases numerous citations
are made to criminal cases. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 600-605 (West 1976 & West Supp.
1987).
91. People ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378, 390, 63 Cal. Rptr.
138, 146 (1967) (citing People v. Wong Loung, 159 Cal. 520, 523, 114 P. 829, 830 (1911)).
92. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d at 388, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing People v. Galloway, 202
Cal. 81, 92, 259 P. 332, 336 (1927)); Shipley v. Permanente Hosp., 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 422,
274 P.2d 53, 56 (1954) (citing Galloway, 202 Cal. at 92, 259 P. at 336, and Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1932)), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal.
2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969).
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misconduct. 93
The practice of using civil and criminal precedent interchangeably is
also common in decisions on evidentiary questions related to juror mis-
conduct. For example, civil courts have followed criminal precedent in
deciding when a party may use a juror's affidavit to impeach a verdict, 94
when a court will presume juror bias to be prejudicial,95 when the oppos-
ing party may rebut that presumption of prejudice, 96 when jurors are
competent witnesses to prove objective facts to impeach a verdict,97 and
when declarations on such issues are admissible.98
Decisions concerning the most fundamental issues of jury selection
have followed the same pattern. Courts deciding appeals in civil cases
use criminal precedent to define the purpose and function of voir dire,99
to establish that a trial before unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an
inseparable and inalienable part of the constitutional right to a trial by
jury, °0 and to find that it is error for a trial court to interfere with the
93. Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 590, 715 P.2d. 624, 641, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 681
(1986) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing People v. Lessard, 58 Cal. 2d 447, 454,
375 P.2d 46, 49, 25 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81 (1962)); Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 952, 161
Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1980) (citing Lessard, 58 Cal. 2d at 454, 375 P.2d at 49, 25 Cal. Rptr. at
81).
94. Andrews v. County of Orange, 130 Cal. App. 3d 944, 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. 176, 181
(1982) (citing People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 349-50, 455 P.2d 132, 136-37, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 196, 200-01 (1969)); Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d at 389, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (citing People
v. Gidney, 10 Cal. 2d 138, 146, 73 P.2d 1186, 1191 (1937)).
95. Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 416-17, 650 P.2d 1171, 1189, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 654, 672 (1982) (citing People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal. 3d 150, 156 n.3, 570 P.2d 1050,
1053 n.3, 141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 701 n.3 (1977)) ("No principled distinction can be drawn be-
tween civil and criminal cases for purposes of the presumption of prejudice arising from juror
misconduct."), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983).
96. Id. at 417, 650 P.2d at 1189, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (citing People v. Phillips, 122 Cal.
App. 3d 69, 81, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 710 (1981)).
97. See Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d at 576, 715 P-2d at 630-31, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 671. In his concur-
rence, Justice Mosk cites People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal. Rptr.
196, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969), for this proposition. He includes, inter alia, three crimi-
nal cases as examples: In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 708 P.2d 1260, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382
(1985) (juror instructing other jurors on the law); People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 593 P.2d
240, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1979) (allowing an alternate juror to sit with the 12 deliberating
jurors); People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal. 3d 150, 570 P.2d 1050, 141 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1977) (the
foreman of the jury consulting an outside attorney).
98. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d. at 596, 715 P.2d at 645, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing) (citing, inter alia, In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d at 397, 708 P.2d at 1262, 220 Cal. Rptr. at
384; People v. Pierce, 24 Cal. 3d 199, 208 n.4, 595 P.2d 91, 95 n.4, 155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661 n.4
(1979); People v. Gidney, 10 Cal. 2d 138, 146, 73 P.2d 1186, 1191 (1937)).
99. In Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 64 Cal. Rptr. 655
(1967), a civil case often quoted for its statement of the purpose of voir dire, the court relied
only on criminal cases as well as a criminal statute for its ruling.
100. Tapia v. Barker, 160 Cal. App. 3d 761, 765, 206 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805 (1984) (citing
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 265, 583 P.2d 748, 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1978));
Andrews v. County of Orange, 130 Cal. App. 3d 944, 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180 (1982)
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exercise of peremptory challenges.' 0 '
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 102 a civil case involving allegations of ju-
ror misconduct, provides a good example of the interchangeable use of
civil and criminal precedent. The plaintiffs in Hasson were a college stu-
dent and his father. The young man suffered injury when the brakes on
his automobile failed as he was driving down a hill. The young man
sued, relying in part on a strict products liability theory. After a lengthy
trial, the jury returned a judgment of more than eleven million dollars.
Ford moved for a new trial on numerous grounds, among them juror
misconduct. In its opinion, the California Supreme Court analyzed a
variety of types of potential juror misconduct, including the jurors' fail-
ure to fulfill their duty of attentiveness. In rejecting Ford's contention
that the jurors' conduct constituted reversible error, the court noted that
appellate courts have consistently refused to reverse judgments due to
jurors sleeping through portions of the trial. To illustrate its point, the
court cited a total of nine cases from five jurisdictions in which appellate
courts failed to overturn verdicts in cases in which jurors were literally
sleeping on the job. Five of them-more than half-were criminal cases.
The Hasson court also discussed cases relating to juror intoxication, cit-
ing four cases, all of them criminal. In discussing cases that rejected
allegations of misconduct based upon the apparently inattentive de-
meanor of jurors during trial proceedings, it mentioned two criminal
cases and one civil case.10 3
Following the courts' use of civil cases using civil and criminal pre-
cedent interchangeably, the rule enunciated in Williams should extend to
civil cases. No case, however, expressly holds that criminal precedent on
jury selection applies to civil cases. Significantly, in the one California
Supreme Court case in which the issue has been mentioned, the court
seemed to imply the opposite.10 4 In People v. Wheeler, a case involving
(citing People v. Hughes, 57 Cal. 2d 89, 95, 367 P.2d 33, 36. 17 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620 (1961), and
People v. Galloway, 202 Cal. 81, 92, 259 P. 332, 336 (1927)); Deward v. Clough, 245 Cal. App.
2d 439, 444, 54 Cal. Rptr. 68, 72 (1966) (citing Hughes, 57 Cal. 2d at 95, 367 P.2d at 36, 17
Cal. Rptr. at 620); Church v. Capital Freight Lines, 141 Cal. App. 2d 246, 248, 296 P.2d 563,
564 (1956) (citing Galloway, 202 Cal. at 92, 259 P. at 336); Shipley v. Permanente Hosp., 127
Cal. App. 2d 417, 424, 274 P.2d 53, 57 (1954) (citing Galloway, 202 Cal. at 92, 259 P. at 336),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 196, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 994 (1969); see also Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d at 589, 715 P.2d at 640,
224 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
101. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 202-03, 288 P.2d 12, 23-24 (1955) (citing Peo-
ple v. Estorga, 206 Cal. 81, 87, 273 P. 575, 577 (1928), and People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470,
481, 268 P. 909, 914 (1928)).
102. 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S.
1190 (1983).
103. Id. at 412, 650 P.2d at 1186, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
104. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 906 n.29 (1978). The issue was indirectly addressed when it emerged by implication in a
concurrence written by Justice Mosk in Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 575-78, 715 P.2d 624,
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peremptory challenges that appeared to be based on racial bias, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court suggested that under some circumstances the
Court would make an independent evaluation of whether a right devel-
oped in a criminal case would extend to a civil litigant. 0 5 The Wheeler
court acknowledged, but did not reach the issue:
We do not reach, however, the question of the applicability 6f this de-
cision to civil cases. Although article I, section 16, of the California
Constitution governs such cases as well, most of the state and federal
authorities relied on herein invoke the requirement of cross-sectional-
ism in the context of a criminal trial only. Whether the requirement
also applies in a civil setting turns on such considerations as the func-
tion of the jury in that setting. Because the issue is not presented in the
case at bar, we leave it to another day. 106
Taken on its face, this footnote in Wheeler would appear to signal a
change from the general practice of applying civil and criminal precedent
interchangeably. That would be an incorrect reading, however, for sev-
eral reasons. First, because that issue was not before the court, the foot-
note was dictum. Second, it is unlikely that the court intended to
abandon its longstanding practice of applying criminal precedent to civil
cases on jury issues through dictum in a footnote. The question remains
then, why mention that issue at all? One explanation may be traceable to
the impact of the Wheeler decision itself. At the time of the decision, the
opinion constituted a radical departure from precedent. With the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court already under attack in 1978 for its perceived lib-
eral treatment of criminal defendants, 10 7 it may not have wanted to break
additional new ground, particularly when unnecessary to the decision.
If, in fact, the footnote in Wheeler was only an attempt to limit the
holding of a controversial case, then there has been no change in the
630-32, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 670-72 (1982). In a separate opinion in the Uribe case, Chief
Justice Bird criticized Justice Mosk's view while addressing the question of the standard for
determination of what constitutes prejudicial misconduct sufficient to trigger the presumption
of prejudice. She chided Justice Mosk:
Apparantly, Justice Mosk would require a much stronger showing to establish preju-
dicial misconduct in civil cases than he has found to be sufficient in criminal cases. If
this result is intended, surely an explanation is required. Until now, the rule has been
firmly established that the presumption of prejudice arising from jury misconduct is
equally applicable in criminal and civil cases.
Id. at 597, 715 P.2d at 646, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 686 (citation omitted).
105. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 263, 583 P.2d 748, 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1978).
106. Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29.
107. Chief Justice Bird and the entire court were under attack from the time that her
nomination was announced by then Governor Jerry Brown. "Since 1977 Rose Bird has come
to symbolize the liberal judge, living proof of the New Right's contention that judges are pri-
marily the defenders of criminals, not of all citizens." B. MEDSGER, FRAMED: THE NEW
RIGHT ATTACK ON CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE BIRD AND THE COURTS 3 (1983). For another
description of Bird's first confirmation election and the subsequent unprecedented investiga-
tion into the inner workings of the California Supreme Court, see P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES
(1981).
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practice of using criminal and civil precedent interchangeably, and the
rule enunciated in Williams should apply to civil cases. Even if the dicta
in the Wheeler footnote is a signal of a new practice eliminating the auto-
matic extension of Williams to civil cases, independent legal and policy
reasons justify applying the Williams standard to civil cases. Next, the
Note focuses on one of those legal reasons-civil litigants' right to re-
ceive the same fair jury trial that criminal defendants receive.
B. Civil Litigants have the Same Right to a Fair Jury as do Criminal
Defendants
(1) Holley v. J. & S. Sweeping Co.: Civil Litigants Have a Right to a Jury
Made Up of a Fair Cross-Section of the Community
In People v. Wheeler, 108 a criminal case, the court considered
whether the defendants, two black men, were denied their right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity.10 9 In that case, although a number of black venirepersons were
summoned and questioned on voir dire, the prosecutor proceeded to
strike each and every black from the jury by the use of his peremptory
challenges. The court reversed the conviction, holding that the use of
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of
group bias "violates the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California
Constitution." 10
Justice Mosk wrote the opinion for the court."' He began his dis-
cussion by restating the basic principle contained in the California Con-
stitution, that "[t]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to
all .... ,,112 That constitutional right included the defendant's right to a
verdict rendered by impartial and unprejudiced jurors. 1 3 Justice Mosk
explained that this principle derived from the common-law rule demand-
ing the strictest impartiality on the part of each individual juror, and that
this principle was fully embodied in the constitutional jury trial provi-
sion. 114 He then explained that an essential prerequisite to an impartial
jury is that it be drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community. 115
108. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
109. Id. at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
110. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
111. He was joined by Justices Tobriner, Manuel, and Newman. Chief Justice Bird wrote a
separate concurring opinion. Id. at 287, 583 P.2d at 768-69, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910. Justice
Richardson wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Clark joined. Id. at 295, 583
P.2d at 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
112. Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 266, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
115. He explained why:
[Vol. 39
After discussing four decades of federal cases that developed the
cross-sectionalism rule, Justice Mosk turned to California law. He
pointed out that although California had adopted such a rule in criminal
cases as early as 1954,116 it remained unclear which constitution, state or
federal, served as the basis for the rule. Determined to avoid a similar
lack of clarity in Wheeler, the court explicitly stated that it was relying
on both the sixth amendment to the federal Constitution, and article I,
section 16, of the California Constitution.117
Discrimination might take place at any one of three stages in the
procedure for selecting a jury. ' 18 The Wheeler court was concerned with
the third stage-the point at which challenges are exercised against indi-
vidual jurors. After describing the two types of challenges,119 Justice
Mosk described their purposes and explained that the scope of both types
of challenges are a function of these purposes. Parties should exercise
challenges to remove only those jurors who the party believes entertain a
"specific bias," and no others.120 In the case of peremptory challenges,
[I]n our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often over-
lapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, educa-
tion, occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation;...
it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions, or even
deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such groups; and hence...
the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the represen-
tation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their
members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out.
Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
116. Id. at 266-70, 583 P.2d at 754-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-99.
117. Id. at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-90.
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution contains the provision regard-
ing federal civil jury trials. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
118. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
119. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 583 P.2d at 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01; see supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
120. Justice Mosk stated:
The purpose of the challenge stage of jury selection is apparent from these statutory
provisions and the constitutional considerations discussed above. Until this point in
the process the goal of an impartial jury is pursued by insuring that the master list be
a representative cross-section of the community and that the venire and the proposed
trial jury be drawn therefrom by wholly random means. But precisely because it is
both all-inclusive and random, the process cannot consistently screen out those pro-
spective jurors who bring to the courtroom a bias concerning the particular case on
trial or the parties or witnesses thereto-we may call this "specific bias"-derived,
for example, from personal experience or from general exposure to pretrial publicity.
Yet such persons must evidently be excused from the jury insofar as possible if the
goal of impartiality is to be achieved. The law therefore presumes that each party
will use his challenges to remove those prospective jurors who appear most likely to
be biased against him or in favor of his opponent; by so doing, it is hoped, the ex-
tremes of potential prejudice on both sides will be eliminated, leaving a jury as impar-
tial as can be obtained from the available venire.
Id. at 274-75, 583 P.2d at 759-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
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although no basis for the challenge must be given, a basis must exist.
Those bases may range from "the obviously serious to the apparently
trivial, from the virtually certain to the highly speculative."' 12 1 When a
party presumes that jurors are biased merely because they are members
of a group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar
grounds, 2 2 and peremptorily challenges all such jurors for that reason
alone, she "not only upsets the demographic balance of the venire but
frustrates the primary purpose of the representative cross-section require-
ment."' 1 3 For this reason, the court held that the use of peremptory
challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the ground of racial
group bias violates the constitutional right to a jury drawn from a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community. 124
Justice Mosk next turned to the difficult question of devising a test
and supplying a remedy for this constitutional violation. He stated the
presumption that any party exercising a peremptory challenge is doing so
for a legitimate and constitutionally permissible reason. Such a presump-
tion must be rebuttable, however, if the "foregoing constitutional right is
not to be nullified .... -125 The court then established a two-stage in-
quiry to determine whether a party has rebutted the presumption. In so
doing, it chose a traditional procedure. First, if a party believes her oppo-
nent is using her peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on group
bias alone, she must make a timely objection, and establish a satisfactory
prima facie case of discrimination. To do so, she must compile as com-
plete a record as possible, and establish that the persons excluded are
members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative
cross-section rule. Second, she must show a strong likelihood that the
opposing party is challenging those jurors because of their membership in
that group and not for any other reason. 26
If and when the trial court finds that a prima facie case has been
made, the burden shifts to the other party to show that she did not base
her peremptory challenges on group bias alone. 12 7 Obviously, this bur-
den requires that counsel reveal to the court and opposing counsel the
reason for a peremptory challenge. Even under these carefully circum-
scribed conditions, this holding represented a radical departure from pre-
121. Id. at 274-75, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
122. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
125. Id. at 278, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
126. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
127. Id. at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. If the court finds that the
offending party has not sustained his burden of justification, the presumption of validity is
rebutted and the court must dismiss the venire and summon a new one. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at
765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
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cedent, 128 as well as an apparent violation of California Penal Code
section 1069.129 Nevertheless, the court found this result to be mandated
by the constitutional imperative guaranteeing the defendant a fair
trial. 130 The importance of the right is underscored by the court's hold-
ing that an error of this type is prejudicial per se and a conviction by a
jury selected through means of group bias must be reversed. 131
The Wheeler court expressly declined to decide whether the decision
applied to civil cases.132 In his dissent, Justice Richardson glumly pre-
dicted that the question would soon be decided in the affirmative:
[A]lthough the majority limits application of the new principles to
criminal cases and leaves "to another day" a determination of whether
the new rules apply to civil cases, the "functions" of a jury, which the
majority treats as controlling, seem remarkably similar in civil and
criminal cases, leading me to conclude that, given the issue in a civil
context, the majority will reach the same result. 133
Holley v. J. & S. Sweeping Co. 134 presented exactly that issue to the
California Court of Appeal in 1983. Lawrence Holley, a black man,
brought a negligence action against respondents. His case was tried
before an all-white jury, and resulted in a nine to three verdict in favor of
the defense. The defendants had exercised peremptory challenges against
three of the four black jurors called into the jury box. 135 The issue on
appeal was whether the exercise of peremptory challenges in civil pro-
128. See id. at 283-85, 583 P.2d at 766-67, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08; see also Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-21 (1965). Since Wheeler was decided, many jurisdictions have
adopted a similar rule. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-91, 387 N.E.
2d 499, 516-18, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). The United States Supreme Court adopted a
similar rule based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than
sixth amendment grounds in Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). See generally Note,
Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195
(1987) (authored by Cynthia Richers-Rowland).
129. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1985); see also supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
130. In a footnote the Wheeler court put it this way:
At this point the statutory provision that "no reason need be given" for a peremptory
challenge must give way to the constitutional imperative: the statute is not invalid on
its face, but in these limited circumstances it would be invalid as applied if it were to
insulate from inquiry a presumptive denial of the right to an impartial jury.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281 n.28, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.28 (citation
omitted).
131. Id. at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
132. Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 n.29; see supra note
106-07 and accompanying text.
133. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 288, 583 P.2d at 769, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
134. 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1983).
135. The fourth juror was excused by the court for cause. Holley, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 590,
192 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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ceedings was subject to scrutiny under the constitutional standard enun-
ciated in People v. Wheeler.
Recognizing that different interests are at stake in criminal and civil
trials, and that different standards of proof apply, the Holley court none-
theless found that "juries in both types of proceedings perform the same
important function of ultimate fact finders under the same state constitu-
tional guarantee."1 36 The court observed that since the primary purpose
of the Wheeler decision was to achieve overall impartiality, failing to ex-
tend the Wheeler rule to civil cases would permit two evils. First, it
would frustrate the fair cross-section rule. Second, it "would conceivably
sanction the indiscriminate use of peremptory challenges based upon
group bias alone thus seriously eroding the constitutional guarantee ex-
tended equally to civil litigants."' 37
The Holley court made an observation central to the question of
application of Williams to civil cases. In discussing an early United
States Supreme Court case on the cross-section rule, Thiel v. Southern
Pacific, 138 the court stated that the United States Supreme Court had
implicitly rejected any conceptual distinction between civil and criminal
cases in the jury selection process, quoting the following language: "The
American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either
criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community."' 39 The Wheeler court's
endorsement of the views expressed in Thiel permitted the Holley court
to interpret "express endorsement to mean that the systematic exclusion
of jurors at any stage of the process in either criminal or civil proceedings
solely on the basis of group bias is constitutionally impermissible."" 40
(2) Applying the Holley Analysis to Williams
Holley extended a criminal procedure from Wheeler designed to pro-
tect the constitutional right to an impartial jury to civil cases when it
afforded civil litigants the protection of the fair cross-section rule. The
court has extended Wheeler to civil cases because in both the criminal
and civil contexts, the jury plays a crucial role as ultimate fact finder.
This extension makes the concern for the right to a fair jury identical in
both civil and criminal cases. The California Supreme Court likewise
should therefore extend Williams to civil cases. As with the procedure at
issue in Wheeler, the Williams rule establishing the right to ask voir dire
questions guarantees the constitutional right to an impartial jury.' 4' In
136. Id. at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
137. Id.
138. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
139. Holley, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 592-93, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The court went on to find, as did the Wheeler
court, that such was a per se error. Id. at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
141. See supra note 27-28 and accompanying text.
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Wheeler, the California Supreme Court suggested the analysis to follow
in determining whether a jury selection procedure that had been first es-
tablished in a criminal case should be extended to civil litigants as well:
"Whether the requirement also applies in a civil setting turns on such
considerations as the function of the jury in that setting." 142 An examina-
tion of the function of the jury in a civil setting, therefore, is necessary to
make that determination.
Concern for a fair trial before an impartial jury prompted both the
Williams and the Wheeler decisions. Both courts were looking at the
third stage of the jury selection process that takes place in court. 143 That
stage consists of two parts. The first is the voir dire, or questioning por-
tion. The second is the challenge portion. Wheeler addressed the second
part in its attempt to assure that the exercise of challenges did not result
in a less than impartial jury. The Williams decision involved the first
part of the in-court selection stage: the juror questioning and informa-
tion-eliciting process, upon which counsel based their challenges.
Wheeler and Williams were both an effort on the part of the California
Supreme Court to assure that the right to a fair jury was not imperiled at
the in-court stage.
Applying the Williams decision to civil cases would be consistent
with the principle that a civil litigant is constitutionally entitled to a fair
trial.144 Historically, the right to a trial by jury has included the right to
a fair trial by an impartial jury. As early as 1899 the California Supreme
Court made this clear in a civil case, Lombardi v. California Street Rail-
way, 145 when it stated:
The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and
inalienable part of the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the consti-
tution. Upon this proposition all the authorities agree. As was said by
Sir Edward Coke in discussing the right of trial by jury, under the head
of propter affectum: "For all which the rule of law is that he must
stand indifferent as he stands unsworn."' 146
142. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.298, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07 n.29.
143. The first stage is the initial compilation of the master list of eligible jurors. Should
that list fail to be representative, the process is constitutionally defective. Id. at 272, 583 P.2d
at 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900. A large portion of the litigation on cross-sectionalism in Califor-
nia and in the federal courts have concentrated on this stage of the process. Id. at 272 n.10, 583
P.2d at 759 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 900 n.10.
The second stage is the point at which prospective jurors are disqualified or excused by
judges or court personnel. Since this step is discretionary, potential for abuse exists and can
upset the demographic balance of the venire in essential respects. Id. at 273, 583 P.2d at 759,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
144. The California Constitution, article I, section 16 does not differentiate between civil
and criminal cases. It states: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but
in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict."
145. 124 Cal. 311, 57 P. 66 (1899).
146. Id. at 317, 57 P. at 68 (citation omitted).
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Half a century later, the court reiterated that position in Shipley v.
Permanente Hospital.147 Since that time, modern courts have continued
to express the fundamental aspect of that guarantee. 148 In Deward v.
Clough, 149 a California Court of Appeal emphasized that the right to a
trial by jury is jurisdictional. In 1971, in Clemens v. Regents of University
of California, a medical negligence case in which one of the jurors inten-
tionally concealed the fact that he was a dentist, another court of appeal
repeated that sentiment, stating that: "The guarantee is to 12 impartial
jurors."150 Later that same year the California Supreme Court strength-
ened this position in Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital. 151 In
Weathers, the court quoted approvingly from Lombardi, reiterating once
again that the constitutional right to a trial by jury included the right to
unbiased and unprejudiced jurors. 152
In recent years the California Courts of Appeal have continued to
147. 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 424, 274 P.2d 53, 57 (1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
People v. Hutchinson, 71 Cal. 2d 342, 455 P.2d 132, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
994 (1969); see also People ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378, 391, 63
Cal. Rptr. 138, 146 (1967) (jury prejudiced because of a juror's disclosure of information re-
ceived outside of court).
148. In many of the cases in which the court has addressed this issue the party has alleged
juror misconduct in the form of concealing bias during voir dire. See Tapia v. Barker, 160 Cal.
App. 3d 761, 766, 206 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805 (1984); Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 954-
55, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381 (1980); Clemens v. Regents of University of California, 20 Cal.
App. 3d 356, 362, 97 Cal. Rptr. 589, 593 (1971); Shipley, 127 Cal. App. 2d at 424-25, 274 P.2d
at 58; Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d at 391-92, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47; see also Church v. Capital
Freight Lines, 141 Cal. App. 2d 246, 248, 296 P.2d 563, 564 (1956) (right to a trial by jury
includes right to mentally competent jurors). But cf. Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d
388, 408, 650 P.2d 1171, 1183, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654, 666 (1982) (failure of one juror to reveal
that he had been a defendant in several lawsuits brought by large corporate creditors and
failure of another to reveal that his son had died of brain damage sustained in an automobile
accident constituted insufficient proof of concealed bias), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983).
149. 245 Cal. App. 2d 439, 444, 54 Cal. Rptr. 68, 72 (1966).
150. Clemens, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 360, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (emphasis in original).
151. 5 Cal. 3d 98, 485 P.2d 1132, 95 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1971).
152. Id. at 110, 485 P.2d at 1140, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 524. Nine years later the court of
appeal again stressed that "[tihe right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable
and inalienable part of the right to a trial by jury ...." Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947,
955, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377, 382 (quoting Lombardi v. California St. Ry., 124 Cal. 311, 317, 57 P.
66, 68 (1899), and Clemens, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 360, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 592.) Smith was followed
two years later by Andrews v. County of Orange, 130 Cal. App. 3d 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. 176
(1982). "The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an 'inseparable and inalienable part'
of the right to jury trial .... The guarantee is to the right to 12 impartial jurors." Id. at 953,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (citations omitted).
That same year the California Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the issue in
a major products liability and personal injury case. Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388,
650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). In Hasson,
the plaintiffs argued that the presumption of prejudice attaching to juror misconduct should
not apply in civil cases. The California Supreme Court soundly rejected such reasoning: "It is
true that the presumption developed in criminal cases. But regardless of the rule's origin, civil
litigants, like criminal defendants, have a constitutionally protected right to the complete con-
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jealously guard that constitutional right. 153
(3) Applying Wheeler/Holley Policy Concerns
Extending Williams to civil cases is also necessary to effectuate the
Wheeler and Holley policy of avoiding the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges. As the Williams court put it:
[L]argely because they have been deprived of a reasonable opportunity
to gather helpful information, counsel have often resorted of necessity
to means of jury selection that are reprehensible and in some cases of
dubious constitutionality. Thus in People v. Wheeler, we held that ju-
rors are not to be peremptorily challenged on the basis of group bias
alone. But unless counsel is given a significant opportunity to probe
under the surface to determine the potential juror's individual atti-
tudes, he may be relegated to a Catch-22 alternative of making his
decision on the superficial basis we held impermissible in Wheeler, or
making it on no basis at all.154
Simple logic requires that Williams be extended to civil cases. Since
Wheeler applies to civil cases, preventing attorneys from challenging ju-
rors on the basis of group bias alone, and since Williams is necessary to
properly apply Wheeler, Williams must apply to civil cases as well.
C. Williams Should Be Extended to Civil Cases to Avoid Juror Misconduct
and Unnecessary Reversals
Juror bias is present in civil litigation, just as it is in criminal cases.
Without adequate voir dire it is impossible for counsel to expose juror
bias, 155 and it becomes more likely a juror will serve on a jury when
counsel should have challenged her. These problems can result in grave
consequences. One of the most serious, of course, is the reversal of the
judgment and the retrial of the case before an impartial jury.1 56
A juror's concealment of a bias, belief, or state of mind that prevents
her from following the court's instructions and acting in an impartial
manner constitutes misconduct in civil cases. 157 When the substantial
rights of a party are affected because of misconduct or irregularity in the
proceedings of the jury, California Code of Civil Procedure section 657
sideration of their case by an impartial panel ofjurors." Id. at 416, 650 P.2d at 1189, 185 Cal.
Rptr. at 672 (citations omitted).
153. See Tapia v. Barker, 160 Cal. App. 3d 761, 765, 206 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805 (1984).
154. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 404-05, 628 P.2d 869, 875, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317,
323 (1981) (citations omitted).
155. See supra note 63-69 and accompanying text.
156. The cases in which this has occurred are plentiful. See supra note 149.
157. Weathers v. Kaiser Founds. Hosps., 5 Cal. 3d 98, 106-10, 485 P.2d 1132, 1337-40, 95
Cal. Rptr. 516, 521-24 (1971); Tapia v. Barker, 160 Cal. App. 3d 761, 765, 206 Cal. Rptr. 803,
805 (1984); Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal. App. 3d 947, 953, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381 (1980); People
ax rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 Cal. App. 2d 378, 388-92, 63 Cal. Rptr. 138, 144-47
(1968).
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requires that the reviewing court grant a new trial. 158 Although not all
concealment of bias during voir dire results from the court's restriction
of permissible voir dire questions, at least one court has remarked that a
more probing voir dire might eliminate the waste of time and judicial
resources necessitated by a reversal. During voir dire in the medical neg-
ligence case of Clemens v. Regents of University of California, 159 a juror
was asked about the nature of his employment. He responded "[W]ell, I
do ranching and I have an office, investment planning."' 60 He failed to
reveal that he was really a dentist. Subsequently, when counsel asked if
he had any bias or prejudice against malpractice litigation, the juror an-
swered in the negative. He also stated he knew of no reason why he
could not be fair and impartial. Counsel failed to ask him about any
relationships he might have with members of the medical profession,
either personally or professionally, although such a question was obvious
since as an investment planner he likely would have had medical profes-
sionals as clients. As it turned out, this juror was extremely biased
against malpractice litigation, and for that reason acted as a strong advo-
cate for the defense during deliberations.161
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's denial of motion for a
new trial based, inter alia, on the juror's misconduct in concealing his
profession during voir dire. The court of appeal stated, "[w]e cannot
help but feel that a more intensive voir dire examination by the court or
counsel on the subjects of occupation, bias, prejudice and prejudgment
158. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 657 (West 1976). The United States Supreme Court re-
cently held in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984), that
the failure of a juror to disclose information during voir dire would not result in a new trial
unless the information was such that it rises to the level of a cause challenge.
159. 20 Cal. App. 3d 356, 97 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1971).
160. Id. at 362, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
161. Id. at 364, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 595. From the record it seemed clear that this juror
wished to conceal his medical profession in order to remain on the jury. Id. at 363, 97 Cal.
Rptr. at 593-94. It is not clear, therefore, whether the juror would have been truthful even if
the attorney had asked additional questions. Although clearly biased, he stated in response to
the questioning of plaintiff's counsel that he had no bias or prejudice against malpractice litiga-
tion. Id. at 362, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 593. Had appropriate open-ended questions been asked,
however, they very likely would have revealed information that would have alerted perceptive
counsel to potential problems. For example, counsel could have asked "What are your feelings
about medical malpractice cases?" and "Do you know any doctors or other medical profes-
sionals?" If the answer to the latter question had been yes, as it should have been, counsel
could have followed up with, "Describe who they are generally, under what circumstances
you've come to know them (e.g., socially, professionally, etc.), how often you see them,
whether you've discussed malpractice suits with any of them, etc." Other questions might
have included, "Have you or anyone you know ever been involved in a lawsuit of any type?"
and "Some people feel that people in our society are just too quick to sue doctors, what do you
think about that?"
Of course, under a strict application of the Edwards rule a court could prohibit most, if
not all, of those questions. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
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might have avoided these unfortunate consequences."' 162
Another recent example of juror misconduct emphasizes the courts'
commitment to reversing judgments rendered by less than neutral jurors.
These reversals emphasize the need to apply the more thorough voir dire
process of Williams to civil trials. In Tapia v. Barker, 163 the plaintiff was
born and raised in Mexico. He brought a negligence action after suffering
serious injuries in an automobile collision. The jury found him fifty per-
cent negligent and awarded him only minimal damages of $12,706.46.164
The court of appeal found the verdict to be tainted by juror misconduct
and reversed, ordering a new trial.
From language in the opinion, it appears that the voir dire questions
covered the relevant issues, but were conclusory and close-ended.165
During deliberations several jurors made disparaging remarks about Mr.
Tapia's background and Mexican citizenship, and about Mexican men in
general. The jurors also made other comments that indicated that some
believed a low verdict would help keep insurance costs down.166 While
there were at least three other types of juror misconduct, 67 the court
stated that "the most destructive misconduct was the insidious discussion
of race."' 168 The juror misconduct resulted in an unfair trial, necessitat-
ing a reversal of the entire judgment. 169
Obviously, it would be a vain hope to expect that with the expansion
of voir dire in civil cases incidents such as those in Clemens and Tapia
162. Clemens, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 367, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 589. Among the unfortunate conse-
quences the court noted was that the trial consumed 33 actual trial days, the transcript was
over 3,400 pages long, and the appellate review took four years. Due to this reversal it was
necessary to retry the case, and another appeal was possible as well. Id. at 367, 97 Cal. Rptr.
at 596.
163. 160 Cal. App. 3d 761, 206 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1984).
164. Id. at 763, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 803.04.
165. The court stated:
During voir dire prospective jurors were explicitly asked whether any of them felt
that pain and suffering were so intangible that he or she would be reluctant to award
damages, or held "any belief that prevents you from awarding damages for pain and
suffering, if liability for them is established." They were also informed of plaintiff's
Mexican background and asked if it would affect their ability to be fair and impartial.
None of them responded affirmatively to either question. The jurors were specifically
instructed that they must follow the law, must base their decision only on the evi-
dence and not be influenced by, inter alia, prejudice.
Id. at 764, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
166. Id. at 764, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
167. These types of juror misconduct includes the following: consideration of collateral
sources of income, discussions regarding the likelihood of high verdicts leading to high insur-
ance rates, and a juror's improper communication of information (regarding her own accident)
from a source outside the evidence in the case. Id. at 766, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
Some, if not all, of this information could have been obtained from jurors with a properly
probing voir dire.
168. Id. at 766, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
169. Id. at 767, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
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would cease to occur. Some jurors will always conceal their bias, as any
trial attorney who has ever made an honest effort to elicit information
from jurors on voir dire will attest.170 When counsel is permitted the
opportunity to ask meaningful questions on issues central to the outcome
of the case, however, the likelihood that she will remove genuinely
prejudiced jurors-those likely to engage in serious misconduct-is
greatly enhanced.
III. Policy Reasons for Refusing to Extend the Williams Rule
Commentators and judges have criticized the Williams rule, particu-
larly for permitting extensive and time-consuming voir dire.' 71 These
criticisms would also apply to civil cases if the court extended the Wil-
liams rule to them. In addition, those opposed to applying this rule to
civil cases are also likely to argue that if the court permits a wider range
of voir dire, parties are likely to appeal, and courts will be more likely to
reverse, resulting in a waste of judicial resources.172 A realistic assess-
ment of this argument requires an examination of the way in which crim-
inal defendants have used the Williams decision to seek appellate relief,
and the reaction of the courts in applying the Williams decision.
Since the June 1, 1981 decision was rendered, only nineteen reported
California decisions have cited Williams.173 Of those, seven were Cali-
170. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
171. See Duncan, Opinion: Putting a Cap on Voir Dire, 7 CAL. LAW. 14 (1987) (arguing
that Williams causes delay in the trial of criminal cases, and is unnecessary because it adds no
meaningful safeguards to the process of selecting a fair and impartial jury); see also Note, The
California Supreme Court Permits Voir Dire to Be Conducted to Uncover a Basis for Peremptory
Challenges, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 169, 188-89 (1984) (authored by J. Epstein) (arguing that
"much of the improvements in the judicial process which this decision sought to achieve will
be lost").
172. In addition, some commentators argue that permitting additional voir dire would
further delay the resolution of already lengthy trials. For a discussion of this problem, see
Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
916, 922 (1971).
173. See People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 171-84, 711 P.2d 480, 500-19, 222 Cal. Rptr.
184, 196-205 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629, 633, 710 P.2d 240, 244, 221 Cal. Rptr.
440, 440 (1985); People v. Armendarez, 37 Cal. 3d 573, 583, 693 P.2d 243, 249, 209 Cal. Rptr.
664, 670 (1984); People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 313, 690 P.2d 669, 676, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196,
203 (1984); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 347, 673 P.2d 680, 698, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 822
(1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984); People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 877, 671 P.2d 813,
832, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 328 (1983) (Richardson, J., dissenting); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.
3d 733, 761, 631 P.2d 446, 465, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 757 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
(1982); People v. Blackwell, 191 Cal. App. 3d 925, 929, 931, 236 Cal. Rptr. 803, 805, 807
(1987); People v. Kronemyer, 189 Cal. App. 3d 314, 335-37, 234 Cal. Rptr. 442, 455 (1987);
People v. Meza, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1631, 1641, 234 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239 (1987); People v. Pagel,
186 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 7, 232 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953
(1987); People v. Kelly, 185 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125, 229 Cal. Rptr. 584, 588 (1986); People v.
Helton, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1145, 209 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130 (1984); People v. Diaz, 152 Cal.
App. 3d 926, 932, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80-81 (1984); Pantos v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d
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fornia Supreme Court cases. The Supreme Court was required to review
all seven of these cases, as they were death penalty automatic appeals.174
Thus, the Supreme Court has not yet chosen to take a case based on an
alleged Williams error.
Only five reported California cases-three from the courts of appeal
and two from the supreme court-have actually considered whether a
conviction should be reversed for failure to permit counsel to ask ques-
tions under the Williams rule. 175 In only one case, People v. Wells, a
court of appeal case and the first case decided on this issue after the
Williams decision, did the court reverse a conviction.176
The Wells opinion notwithstanding, the California Courts of Appeal
have evidenced a marked reluctance to reverse convictions on the basis of
a Williams error. There is no reason to believe that they would be more
willing to reverse such a judgment in civil cases. In the first of the only
two reported appellate decisions to consider the issue since Wells, the
court did not come close to finding that the trial court abused its discre-
tion. That case, People v. Helton, was a three and one half page opinion,
devoting less than a page to the voir dire issue. 177 Although the court
appeared to both misread and misapply Williams, 1 78 its confusion was
neither the result of an unclear standard nor of an attempt to develop a
judicial interpretation of the rule to stem a flood of frivolous appeals.
In the second post-Wells case to consider a Williams issue, People v.
258, 264, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489, 493 (1984); People v. Wells, 149 Cal. App. 3d 721, 725, 726, 197
Cal. Rptr. 163, 166, 167 (1983); People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d 224, 300, 190 Cal. Rptr.
211, 266 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Green v. California, 464 U.S. 1046 (1984); People v.
Alvarado, 133 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1015 n.5, 184 Cal. Rptr. 483, 488 n.5 (1982); People v.
Randel, 130 Cal. App. 3d 286, 293, 181 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1982).
174. People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985); People v.
Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629, 710 P.2d 240, 221 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1985); People v. Armendarez, 37
Cal. 3d 573, 693 P.2d 243, 209 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1984); People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690
P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803 (1983); People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983);
People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981).
Of the remaining cases, one was a civil complaint for declaratory relief to obtain access to
juror lists. Pantos v. City and County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 258, 261, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 489, 493 (1984).
175. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 183-84, 711 P.2d at 500-01, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05 (1985);
Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d at 638-39, 710 P.2d at 244, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 444; Kronemyer, 189 Cal.
App. 3d at 335-36, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 452; Helton, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
130; Wells, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 725-26, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67.
176. 149 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
177. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 209 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1984).
178. The court appeared to believe that part of the trial court's discretion under Williams
is to bar questioning if it has the effect of educating jurors. Id. at 1145, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
If educating is the only purpose, that reading of Williams is correct. When education, how-
ever, is only ancillary to another proper purpose, Williams dictates that it is to be permitted.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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Kronemyer, 179 the court of appeal went to some lengths to explain why
the voir dire questions attempted by the defense squarely met the Wil-
liams requirement, yet it refused to reverse because of the trial court's
failure to permit these questions. It specifically found that the trial court
had erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to ask a prospective juror
whether she could imagine that a competent but lonely, elderly client
might voluntarily make a substantial gift to her attorney. 1 80 According to
the court, the inquiry was "directly relevant to the defense"'' 8 and
within the category of prejudices "which either the local community or
the population at large is commonly known to harbor ... that may...
significantly skew deliberations in fact."1 12 It even found "the scope of
the inquiry to be exceptionally relevant."1 83 But because the trial court
had not entirely foreclosed the defense inquiry into the relevant area and
because the defense voir dire had been cursory, the court of appeal found
no prejudice. 184
In neither of the two California Supreme Court opinions considering
the issue did the court reverse the conviction on the basis of Williams
error. People v. Fuentes 185 held that counsel had been unreasonably re-
stricted in his right to ask questions on the "intent to kill" instruction
that jurors had to apply in death penalty cases.1 86 As the special circum-
stances 187 finding had to be reversed on other grounds, however, the
court did not reach the question of whether the exclusion of the proposed
voir dire question would have provided an independent ground for
reversal. 88
In People v. Balderas, 189 the only other case in which the supreme
court looked at the issue of what questions should be permitted under
179. 189 Cal. App. 3d 314, 234 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1987).
180. Id. at 336, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
181. Id. at 336, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
182. Id. at 337, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. 40 Cal. 3d 629, 710 P.2d 240, 221 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1985).
186. Id. at 638-39 & n.5, 710 P.2d at 244 & n.5, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 444 & n.5.
187. "Special circumstances" is the term used to denote the criteria that must be met to
esculate an ordinary murder conviction into a death penalty case. In a potential death penalty
case the jury first deliberates on the question of whether the defendant is guilty. If all twelve
vote guilty, deliberations continue and address the question of whether the special circum-
stances allegation is true or not true. If it is found to be true then the jury returns to the
courtroom for the penalty phase of the trial. CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 190-190.2. (West Supp.
1987).
188. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d at 639, 710 P.2d at 244, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
189. 41 Cal. 3d 144, 187, 711 P.2d 480, 504, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 207 (1985). Balderas'
trial was held six months prior to the decision in Williams, which only applied to trials con-
ducted after it was filed. Id. at 183, 711 P.2d at 500-01, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The court used
the Williams rationale, however, because "its reasoning logically extends to the issue presented
here." Id.
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Williams, the court sustained the trial court's application of the Williams
rule and refused to reverse a conviction.' 90 The two questions that the
defendant claimed were prejudicially excluded were on circumstantial ev-
idence and diminished capacity. The court first held that limiting ques-
tions on circumstantial evidence would not be an abuse of discretion
because the average juror would probably not disagree with the court's
instructions. It did find, however, that the lower court would have erred
had it restricted questioning on the doctrine of diminished capacity.' 9'
Because the trial court did not impose such a limitation, the supreme
court declined to find the court's restriction on voir dire improper or
prejudicial.' 92
From this review, it is obvious that judicial resources are not being
drained as feared by critics, either in deciding cases appealed on Williams
grounds or in retrying cases reversed for Williams error. 193
The real complaints about the Williams rule come from those judges
and attorneys who feel that the voir dire process is cumbersome and
abused by counsel.194 Undoubtedly, voir dire can be a tedious and time
consuming process. To some extent litigants, courts, and jurors simply
must put up with the process to obtain an impartial jury. Of course,
abuses should be limited where possible. The solution, however, is not to
limit the scope of legitimate voir dire, because its scope is hot the source
of the abuse. 195
I believe that the abuse or misuse of the voir dire process stems from
two main sources: lack of attorney training, and lack of adequate prepa-
ration. Lack of training can result in unfocused and excessively lengthy
voir dire. It is my experience that most attorneys find it difficult to con-
duct an adequate voir dire examination. As a result, they fall back on
tactics condemned since the days of the Edwards rule--educating the
jurors, defusing the opposition's case, and getting the jurors to make
190. Id. at 187, 711 P.2d at 504, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 207. The Supreme Court also took this
opportunity to restate the Williams standard regarding questioning on specific doctrines of
law: "[Q]uestioning need be allowed only on a doctrine both material to the trial and contro-
versial." Id. at 184, 711 P.2d at 502, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
191. Id. at 184, 711 P.2d at 502, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06.
192. Id. at 187, 188, 711 P.2d at 503-04, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
193. This may or may not signify a problem with the decision. Critics of the Williams
decision may argue that the standard is so nebulous that it has not been a useful tool for courts
and counsel and for that reason there are few Williams issues that reach the appellate courts.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 172.
The lack of many appellate decisions on Williams issues may only signify that courts and
counsel are still in the process of developing their practice utilizing the new rule. In the final
analysis, it is the trial courts and counsel who must participate in the day to day implementa-
tion of the rules under which voir dire will be conducted.
194. See Duncan, supra note 172.
195. Blame for lack of information about jurors can not all be laid at the feet of the trial
courts. Often it is the failure of counsel to properly utilize the latitude provided by the courts
that results in the lack of information about juror attitudes. See Hanley, supra note 65.
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commitments. One real solution is to train attorneys to conduct voir dire
so that their questions are insightful, well phrased, and sensitively asked.
Attorneys then could elicit information much more efficiently and
rapidly. 196
Voir dire does not have to be excessively lengthy to be effective.
Voir dire becomes lengthy when it is misused: when attorneys use the
time not to listen to jurors, but to talk at them, impress them, or get them
to make commitments. 19
7
Voir dire becomes vague and unfocused when an attorney, although
trying to use the process for its intended purpose, does not adequately
prepare, so that her questions fail to elicit the information needed. The
attorney can avoid the problem if she carefully analyzes the elements of
her case, and isolates those issues that are likely to be controversial or
have the potential for engendering juror bias.198 Such analysis will pro-
vide the foundation for developing open-ended voir dire questions and
the basis for the attorney's response to questions by the judge concerning
the relevance of various questions under the Williams test. Then, when a
dispute arises during the voir dire over whether a question should be
permitted, counsel will be prepared to explain its relevance to the court
196. Compare the amount of time it takes to ask questions in the style of the game
"Twenty Questions": Is your husband employed?; What company does he work for?; What
type of work does he do for them?; How long has he been there?; Does he supervise other
workers? with the following approach, described by Hanley:
"Folks," Judge Grady had said in a pleasant, quiet voice, "instead of me or the law-
yers asking you a bunch of questions ... why don't you just stand up and tell us
about yourself, what you do for a living, what your spouse does. Tell us about your
family and how you like to spend your time. Tell us what interests you.".... [E]ach
juror stood and unself-consciously gave the lawyers a startlingly effective picture of
himself. No list of subjects was used, and the order of the subjects they selected was
as illuminating as the substance of their statements.
Hanley, supra note 65, at 22.
The latter, open-ended questions, will usually elicit more information than the previous
five. If they do not, the attorney can ask follow-up questions have to cover the areas missed.
Such open-ended questions have other advantages as well. Their use conveys to the juror the
message that the attorney wants the juror to talk. This results in the juror being more forth-
coming in subsequent answers, which may eliminate the need to ask some questions, saving
still more time. In addition, the attorney is talking less when she uses open-ended questions
and is listening to the juror more. Finally, because the juror is being encouraged to speak in a
more narrative fashion, the attorney has an opportunity to learn something about the juror's
use of language and syntax, speech patterns, and personality-all of which are important in
evaluating the juror's individual role within the jury.
When voir dire is conducted in a sensitive open-ended fashion the juror comes away feel-
ing respected, knowing that the lawyer was listening to her, and not just being manipulative.
The attorney feels less frustrated, as she has learned some useful information upon which to
base challenges. The court can feel comfortable knowing that counsel is utilizing the process
for the purpose for which it was intended, and others listening are less bored because the juror
volunteers interesting, personalized information.
197. See supra notes 195-96.
198. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 5, §§ 9.01-.03.
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and the court can make an informed decision on whether to permit it.
Under these conditions the court most likely will permit reasonable ques-
tions, and controversy will be kept to a minimum. Most importantly,
trials can proceed efficiently and fairly.
Conclusion
In our system of justice, the right to a fair jury trial is perhaps the
most fundamental protection provided by the federal and state constitu-
tions. The right to exercise a peremptory challenge is essential to en-
forcement of that protection in both civil and criminal trials. For
counsel to intelligently utilize the peremptory challenge, broad voir dire
is necessary. The court should not require counsel to resort to circum-
venting the existing rules, engaging in guessing games, or descending to
the type of discriminatory practices condemned in Wheeler to exercise
this important right. Indeed, in Williams the California Supreme Court
acknowledged the need for broad voir dire to protect the constitutional
right of criminal defendants to a fair and impartial jury. The rule of
People v. Williams should extend to civil cases, because such a rule is
necessary to effectuate the civil litigant's right to a fair and impartial
jury.
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